Both these reports ask questions of the Georgian leadership and to what extent the US promised them backing.

Obviously, the attempt by Georgia to rein in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by violating the ceasefire and engage the Russians was a foolhardy scheme. Was it a serious attempt to forcefully establish Tbilisi's control over these areas?

Or maybe there was something else at play here. Georgia has been lobbying for NATO membership with US support for years now, but its latest membership application was blocked by European countries who did not wish to antagonise Russia.

Was this foolhardy offensive by Georgia a way to show Europe its vulnerability against a larger "aggressor" and thus justifying NATO membership? If this is the case, did the US hope that any sort of Russian counteroffensive would galvanise support in Europe for Georgian entry into NATO?

If the Georgian breaking of last week's ceasefire was not a huge miscalculated blunder of its own devising, then was it taken on the understanding that the US would deliver more support than it eventually did? Given Georgia's close relationship with Washington, then it would be hard to believe that the US didn't have an inkling of what was going on. Perhaps Georgia was promised greater US support than merely the diplomatic indignation that Washington followed through with.

If such promises were made, then Washington may well have changed its mind once the operation was underway. Given the hard-line Russian attitude to its military's presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Washington may have realised that its level of political capital is weaker than first thought, and that Russian resolve was stronger. Was this a Georgian blunder, a State Department blunder, do both share the blame? In any case, despite the Western media's pro-Georgia stance it can't change the fact that Georgia had reneged on its ceasefire and this weakens its claim to be a victim of an aggressor.

In any case now, Russia can take advantage of the situation and could enforce regime-change in Tbilisi if it wanted. It is unlikely to wish to forcibly incorporate Georgia into the Federation despite the apocalyptic fears of Western sabre-rattlers. A safely pro-Kremlin government in an independent Georgia would serve its interests much better than having to fight a pro-independence insurgency.

If Georgia's pro-western state is to survive then it needs to cut its losses regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia (recognising independence) and hope its concessions to this will get Russian forces to withdraw from rump Georgia. Tbilisi would be negotiating from a very weakened position and right now, any negotiated settlement which allows rump Georgia to survive with its pro-western government and military intact should be heartily accepted.