(1) When an Alec Station detailee, Doug Miller, drafted a cable to the FBI saying that Almihdhar had a US visa, deputy unit chief Tom Wilshire instructed the cable not be sent. Wilshire then failed to reply to a reminder from Miller that the matter needed to be dealt with.

(2) Alec Station then generated a cable incorrectly saying that the information about Almihdhar's visa had already been passed to the FBI. 50-60 CIA officers read a set of cables about Almihdhar and Alhazmi and, based on these cables, should have (a) informed the FBI, (b) checked the FBI had been informed, and (c) watchlisted Alhazmi, Almihdhar and others. We don't know why there was such a complete failure to perform these 3 simple and routine tasks. One explanation is that the officers saw the cable that said the FBI had already been informed and figured they didn't have to inform the Bureau again. We know that in one case an officer accessed a cable with information that should have been passed to the FBI and the cable falsely stating that the information had already been passed and then did not inform the Bureau.

(3) A CIA officer detailed to the FBI twice briefed FBI counterparts on Almihdhar, both times omitting to mention his US visa. He then detailed the contents of the briefings in an e-mail, which he sent to another CIA colleague who had been asked to brief the FBI on Almihdhar. Because the officer had already given 2 briefings, the colleague did not pass on any information. Had the colleague briefed the FBI, it is highly likely he would have mentioned the visa, which was a key piece of information for the FBI. Both FBI agents briefed by the officer later said they had no idea why they received the briefings, as they were not designated contact points for the CIA.

The CIA ignored three requests, in November 2000, April 2001 and July 2001, from lead Cole investigator Ali Soufan for information about al-Qaeda's Malaysia meeting and Khallad bin Attash. Giving Soufan this information would clearly have stopped the plot.

(4) In May and June 2001, after the CIA had held out on Soufan's second request, Wilshire and another CIA officer, Clark Shannon, then made a play to find out how much the FBI knew about the Malaysia meeting and the two hijackers. Wilshire passed three photos of the meeting - of Alhazmi, Almihdhar and a man who apparently looked like Fahad al-Quso (probably bin al-Shibh) - to the FBI, but failed to provide the relevant information (like, Alhazmi and ALmihdhar had met the Cole bombers and travelled to the US). Lawrence Wright comments: "Thanks to Soufan’s interrogation of , the Cole investigators had an active file on Khallad and were preparing to indict him. Knowledge of that fourth photo would likely have promoted O’Neill to demand that the CIA turn over all information relating to Khallad and his associates. By withholding the picture of Khallad attending the meeting with the future hijackers , the CIA may in effect have allowed the September 11th plot to proceed." (Looming Tower, p. 340). At a June 11 meeting with the Cole investigators Shannon showed them the three photos and asked if they recognised al-Quso. The Cole investigators realised this was crap and that Shannon was holding out on them and the meeting descended into a shouting match. Wilshire and Shannon had no interest other than finding out whether the Cole investigators knew about Alhazmi and Almihdhar. Wright comments that the reason for passing the three photos and holding the meeting is "Wilshire did want to know, however, what the FBI knew." (p. 340).

(5) Wilshire sent out an e-mail misrepresenting Alhazmi's travel, saying he flew from Bangkok, to LA, to Hong Kong, indicating that their journey did not end in the US. The e-mail also states that Alhazmi flew with someone (actually Almihdhar), although according to the OCT Wilshire did not know and could not have known Alhazmi was with Almihdhar on this flight. Simple question: how did Wilshire know that? He must have had access to additional reporting on Alhazmi and Almihdhar. What additional reporting?

(6) When the FBI finally found out that Almihdhar was in the US in late August 2001, Wilshire wrongly advised that the search for him should be conducted as an intelligence investigation, not a criminal investigation, meaning that very few resources could be devoted to it.

Wilshire was detailed to the FBI in May 2001, re-accessed all the relevant cables and discussed them with other CIA officers. Despite this, he failed to share any of this information with the FBI. He also managed to get himself involved in the Moussaoui case.

This is not just a little bit of failure or a smidgen of incompetence it is complete and total failure at every step. Wilshire even admitted this himself, telling the Joint Inquiry:

Every place that something could have gone wrong in this over a year and a half, it went wrong. All the processes that had been put in place, all the safeguards, everything else, they failed at every possible opportunity. Nothing went right.” (p. 151)

They failed because he made them fail.

One of the 9/11 Commission’s more eyebrow-raising claims was that:



We might be inclined to disregard this claim anyway, as it is based on KSM’s interrogations, at which torture (waterboarding, threats to harm his children) was used. However, it is also contradicted by a declassified State Department cable (as well as lots of other evidence). The cable was sent in August 1998, after Taliban leader Mullah Omar called the State Department to discuss the missile strikes against Afghanistan. It was declassified following an FOIA request from the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The relevant passage reads:



The members of bin Laden’s network who plotted to blow up airliners over the Pacific (the “bojinka” plot) and conspired to kill the pope (and Bill Clinton) are WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Abdul Hakim Murad and KSM (see, for example, Chapter Four of the New Jackals by Simon Reeve), so the declassified cable indicates that the 9/11 Commission’s claim is false, KSM was part of bin Laden's network years before the embassy bombings, and the US was aware of this, if further proof were needed.

There is also a mountain of other evidence that KSM was part of bin Laden’s network before 1998. For example see here:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timelin...

The Malaysia meeting was a major planning session for 9/11 and was held from 5-8 January 2000 and attended by various al-Qaeda operatives, some of whom went on to participate in the operation. The CIA and NSA found out about it in advance by tapping one of the hijackers’ phones, so it was also surveilled by Malaysian intelligence and the results were passed to the CIA. However, no complete list of the attendees has ever been published.

In his book Intelligence Matters, Bob Graham, co-chairman of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, makes the following claim:



Graham seems pretty solid as a source to me, so we can add al-Harazi to the other 6 generally accepted attendees (the total is supposed to be 13):
(1) Khalid Almihdhar, American 77 hijacker;
(2) Nawaf Alhazmi, American 77 hijacker;
(3) Tawfiq bin Attash (aka Khallad) al-Qaeda commander;
(4) Abu Bara al-Taizi, candidate hijacker;
(5) Hambali, head of al-Qaeda franchise in SE Asia; and
(6) Yazid Sufaat, member of al-Qaeda franchise, associate of Zacarias Moussaoui.

So who is this al-Harazi?
This may only be one of his aliases. In the wake of the October 2000 Cole bombing CNN reported:



The 9/11 Commission refers to him as Abd al Rahim al Nashiri and has a section on him on pages 152-3, but, for some reason, doesn’t mention he attended the Malaysia meeting.

The CIA admits it received surveillance from the Malaysia meeting, but its defence is that, through an unfortunate series of missteps, it didn’t really recognise its significance or figure out who the people were, and failed to register that Almihdhar and Alhazmi flew to the US a week after the meeting ended.

The thing is, an al-Qaeda operative in custody had already identified a photo of al-Nashiri and the Saudis had sent the US notification of an arms smuggling plot he was involved in, so the excuse the CIA didn’t know who he was is going to be a lot harder to make here.

So what’s the story with the photo?
The 9/11 Commission tells us (in endnote 28 on page 491) that for Nashiri’s involvement in the embassy bombing plot we should see “FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al Owhali, Sept. 9, 1998, p. 6.” This document is the FBI 302 for al-Owhali, who was supposed to be martyred in the attack, but ended up not dying and was captured and talked. It was helpfully released after the Moussaoui trial and you can find it here:
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/...

On page 6 we find that what al-Nashiri did in the embassy bombings plot was to procure a false passport in Yemen for al-Owhali, who knew al-Nashiri by the alias Bilal. However, if you carry on reading to page 16 you find this:



I don’t know where the photo came from, but Saudi Arabia uncovered a plot to smuggle antitank missiles in which al-Nashiri (and perhaps Almihdhar and Alhazmi) were involved in early 1998. The US was apparently informed in June 1998, so I suppose the photo could have been passed along then.

I didn’t believe the CIA’s account of its botching the Malaysia surveillance anyway, but this - the fact a prisoner had already identified a photo of al-Nashiri and the US had been told about his arms smuggling - makes it even less likely that the CIA is telling us the full truth of what happened.

If you are interested in further reading, the 9/11 Timeline’s chapter on the Malaysia meeting can be found here:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timelin...

This just got posted. It's surprising, to say the least.

Something new from Matt that I thought was interesting:

I've seen similar stuff, but not this piece before. Maybe you're in the same boat, so here it is:



It's dated 7 October 2001. Does this count as independent confirmation of the Indian reports?

You've probably already read it, but if you haven't, you can find it here.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn112820...

Brief summary: he says we're all nuts, should get therapy and have caused the American left to decline.

This passage struck me as being completely bizarre:



He appears to be suggesting that (a) the CIA is lying and knew much more about the hijackers than it let on (my comment: he's right, it is lying), but (ii) we shouldn't trouble ourselves about it any more, because it's just not going to be a false flag attack and it's probably incompetence anyway.

This is the wierdest thing I've seen for some time. In the sentence "Sometime an undercover agent will actually propose an action ... to put the plotters in a position where they can be caught red-handed" he seems to be suggesting that the CIA (or other agency) even facilitated the attack itself. However, he doesn't seem to want a new investigation.

This is just completely bizarre and anti-democratic - how can democracy work without scrutiny of the intelligence services? If the CIA is lying (it is), then let's have their lies exposed and see the relevant officials go to jail - for the cover-up, if nothing else. If they knew more about the hijackers or even helped them, then let's have all the messy details, because the details of 9/11 frame the debate about the trade-off between civil liberties and security we are currently making.

By my count there will then be 81 videos possibly showing the flight to be released. At the current rate it should take a mere 30 years or so to get them. My money is on it showing Scottish Football Association again.

www.911review.com has a new(ish) section concerning the "big tent" strategy that has been used by the 9/11 truth movement.

Needless to say, I like the article a lot. It begins:



and continues



And I like this bit too:



I suppose one could criticise the website and its sister site http://911research.wtc7.net for sometimes supporting arguments it really shouldn't - hijackers still alive springs to mind. I think there is quite a bit of argument inside the movement, but it mostly seems to focus on the endless debates between planers and no-planers, whereas some of the other stuff gets missed out.

A random list of stuff we should drop:
(1) Hijackers still alive;
(2) No Arabs on Flight 77;
(3) Osama had nothing to do with it and is a nice man really;
(4) "Hi mom, this is Mark Bingham";
(5) Mohamed Atta's passport was found on 9/11;
(6) Oil pipeline in Afghanistan, although this hasn't actually been mentioned for ages;
(7) I would also encourage all you no-planers out there to read Jim Hoffman's essay "The Pentagon Attack: What the Physical Evidence Shows", which you can find here:
http://911research.wtc7.net/essays/pentago...

As you may have noticed, the 9/11 Timeline has switched from a system of big updates to putting out entries in dribs and drabs, usually, say, 20-30 a week or so, to which I make a very, very modest contribution. Over 100 new entries were added in October, in addition to lots of alterations to old ones. To find the new entries, just go to the site:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/project...
and click on the "Recently Added Events" button near the top. The last 100 events added can be displayed.

This is my selection of a few representative and interesting new entries for October:

March 6, 2000 and After: Numerous CIA Officers Learn Hijacker Is in US; Fail to Inform FBI
After the CIA learns that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 2-5, 2000) and hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi has arrived in Los Angeles (see March 5, 2000), operational documents reporting this are accessed by numerous CIA officers, most of whom are in the Counterterrorism Division. However, it is unclear what is done with this information as CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorism Center Director Cofer Black will later incorrectly testify that nobody read the cable stating Alhazmi had entered the US (see October 17, 2002), so the use to which the information is put is never investigated. In addition, the CIA fails to inform the FBI that the al-Qaeda operative has entered the US. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 182>
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context...


Between February 23, 2001 and June 2001: Germans Monitor Call Between Moussaoui and Bin Al-Shibh
While Zacarias Moussaoui is living in Norman, Oklahoma, and getting flight training there, he makes a phone call to Germany that is monitored by German intelligence. The call is to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who is intimately involved in the 9/11 plot and has been a roommate of hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi. Bin al-Shibh stayed in London for a week in early December 2000 and met with Moussaoui there (see October 2000-February 2001). Phone records further indicate that there was at least one phone call between Moussaoui and the landlord of the Hamburg apartment where Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers lived. But the timing of the call has not been revealed, nor is it known if that call was monitored as well or not.

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context...


July 5, 2001: Ashcroft Is Warned of Imminent, Multiple Attacks from Al-Qaeda
The CIA briefs Attorney General Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat. He is warned that a significant attack is imminent, preparations for multiple attacks are in the late stages or already complete, and that little additional warning can be expected. The briefing addresses only threats outside the US. He was also briefed by the CIA on the al-Qaeda threat on May 15, 2001. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258-259, 534> One week later, the FBI will brief him about the al-Qaeada threat in the US and he will reportedly reply, “I do not want to hear about this anymore” (see July 12, 2001). By the end of July, he will stop flying commercial aircraft in the US (see July 26, 2001).
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, al-Qaeda

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context...


5:43 a.m.: Hijackers Check in at Portland Airport; Atta Becomes Angry with Ticket Agent
Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari check in at the US Airways counter at Portland International Jetport Airport. They are wearing ties and jackets. Atta checks in two bags, Alomari none. Atta is randomly selected for additional security scrutiny by the FAA’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.)). However, the only consequence is that his checked bags will be held off the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 2 ; CNN, 3/3/2006> Noting that their flight is soon due to leave, the ticket agent who checks them in, Michael Tuohey, says, “You’re cutting it close.” Tuohey thinks the pair seems unusual. He notices they both have $2,500 first-class, one-way tickets. He later comments, “You don’t see many of those.” Atta looks “like a walking corpse. He looked so angry.” In contrast, Tuohey says, Alomari can barely speak English and has “a goofy smile, I can’t believe he knew he was going to die that day.” Tuohey will later recount, “I thought they looked like two Arab terrorists but then I berated myself for the stereotype and did nothing.” Atta becomes angry when Tuohey informs him he will have to check in again in Boston. He complains that he was assured he would have a “one-step check-in.” <9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 2 ; Associated Press, 3/7/2005> Tuohey will be recalled to work later in the day to speak to an FBI agent about his encounter with Atta and Alomari. He is shown video footage of them passing through the airport’s security checkpoint upstairs (see (Between 5:45 a.m. and 5:53 a.m.)). Although recognizing the two men, he notices that in the video they are no longer wearing the jackets and ties they’d had on when checking in just minutes before. He assumes they must have taken these off and tucked them into their carry-on baggage. He is also informed that the security camera behind his own desk, which should have captured the two hijackers, has in fact been out of order for some time.
Entity Tags: Portland International Jetport Airport

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context...


July 2003: Bin Laden Hunt Frustrated Because Equipment Is in Iraq
Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, commander of US troops in Afghanistan at this time, will later complain that an opportunity to kill bin Laden is lost due to a lack of the right equipment. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like the Predator are in short supply due to the war in Iraq. Vines receives intelligence that bin Laden is on the move and can take one of three routes. However, there is only one UAV to send. Vines will later recall, “A UAV was positioned on the route that was most likely, but he didn’t go that way. We believed that we were within a half-hour of possibly getting him, but nothing materialized.”
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context...

The official account of the arrest of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is that it was made in Rawalpindi by Pakistani security forces on Saturday, 1 March 2003.
Links:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-03...
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,...
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/... /

However, due to a whole grabbag of discrepancies in the official account, many conspiracy theorists have speculated that, while KSM may well be in custody, the story of his actual arrest is entirely fictional and he was probably arrested elsewhere, earlier.
Link:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/essay.j...

Thankfully, 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton have now cleared the matter up. In their new book "Without Precedent" they put an end to speculation:



Well, that's that, the "Rawalpindi arrest" story should surely be dead now.

On edit: spelling of "Karaichi".

VP Dick Cheney recently justified the NSA's "domestic wiretapping program" by saying:



The two terrorists in question are American 77 hijackers Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi. The terrorist-related number (why does he use the plural, what other number?) is 00 967 1200578, an Al Qaeda communications hub in Sana'a, Yemen. Unfortunately for Cheney, he forgot that one of the main things the administration is trying to cover up about 9/11 (for example the 9/11 Omission Report does not mention them) is that Al Hazmi made calls from the US to the hub and that the NSA intercepted them, as the hub was one of its hottest targets. So thanks for the slip, Dick.

The president made a similar slip about a year ago:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20...

Please also bear in mind that:
(1) Both Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi had been known to US authorities as top Al Qaeda operatives since early 1999, at least, and the CIA had followed them halfway round Asia, knew Al Hazmi was in the US and knew Al Mihdhar had a US visa;
(2) In addition to the San Diego calls, the NSA intercepted several of their communications inside the Middle East;
(3) The NSA also intercepted calls made by Nawaf's brother, hijacker Salem Al Hazmi;
(4) At least two of the phones used to make the calls from/to the US were registered to Nawaf Al Hazmi;
(5) When not away on jihad, Al Mihdhar actually lived at the communications hub in Yemen with his wife and children, so the NSA were tapping a hijacker's home phone for three years before 9/11;
(6) The NSA intercepted the calls from/to the US - the ones that are the justification for the NSA's "domestic wiretapping program" - and drafted dispatches on some of them;
(7) Al Mihdhar was on the NSA's watchlist between January and May 2000, when some of the calls were made;
(8) Some of the US-Yemen calls were made when one or both of them was living with FBI informer Abdussatar Sheikh;
(9) The NSA has claimed they didn't realise it was Khalid Al Mihdhar making the calls even though the caller was named "Khalid" and was calling Al Mihdhar's home number (which the NSA knew Al Mihdhar was associated with) to talk to his wife;
(10) The NSA, which had a budget of USD 3.6 billion in 2000, has claimed it was impossible to trace the calls and that it was possible to trace the calls, but they didn't because they were frightened of domestic spying allegations. Both claims cannot be true. In addition, if they were worried about domestic spying allegations, then they must have known he was in the US.

In short, the NSA is telling us it couldn't figure out Al Mihdhar was in the US even though he made 8 calls from phones registered to his partner in San Diego to his home number, which was one of the NSA's hottest targets. Let's say I'm a touch suspicious of this.

Some interesting stuff on the topic:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timelin...

http://www.unknownnews.org/0512231221whopp...

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles...

http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statem...

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5479799 /
(Section entitled "The Calls" about 1/3 of the way down)

There's also a few heavily redacted sections about it in the Joint Inquiry Report.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creport...

The CIA freely admits that it followed American 77 hijackers Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi, as well as Nawaf's brother Salem, halfway around Asia in January 2000. However, it claims to have lost them in Thailand on 8 January 2000, one week before they entered the US. Allegedly, Thai intelligence didn't notify the CIA that Al Hazmi had entered the US until 5 March 2000, when a cable was drafted to this effect and sent to Langley.

In testimony before the joint House and Senate select intelligence committee investigating the Sept. 11 attacks CIA Director George Tenet claimed that:



and



However, the CIA's Office of Inspector General later drafted a report on the CIA's performance before 9/11 and some passages of it were redacted and used in evidence at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui. Here's the relevant one:



This clearly shows that Tenet was lying when he said nobody had read it. The thing is that Tenet was under oath. Here's the relevant passage:



My knowledge of US law is not that good – would lying under oath to Congress be bad?

Postscript 1: The 9/11 Commission also made an error here. It claims that, “No one outside the Counterterrorist Center was told any of this.” (about Al Hazmi's travel to LA, p. 181). However, according to the CIA OIG, only “most” of the officers who accessed the reporting were in the CTC, which means that some of them weren't. Why am I not surprised the Commission got it wrong?

Postscript 2: Also, I'd like to point out that:
(a) According to minutes taken on 9/11 and declassified this year, the 3 hijackers were actually followed, even after the CIA says they stopped following them:
http://www.outragedmoderates.org/images/ca...

(b) Hijacker Khalid Al Mihdhar claimed he was followed to the US:
http://journals.democraticunderground.com/...

(c) The NSA was intercepting the hijackers' calls:
http://journals.democraticunderground.com/...

There are various issues related to Moussaoui case, but I'd now like to take a look at its connection to the Phoenix Memo; new information appeared about this after the Moussaoui trial, as an unredacted version of the DOJ's Office of Inspector General's report into the Bureau's handling of intelligence before 9/11 was released after the Moussaoui trial. It can be found here:
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0606/fin... ...

The previous version was heavily redacted and the whole chapter dealing with Moussaoui was absent. Having looked through it now, it seems fairly clear that one of the reasons (perhaps the main reason) that a FISA warrant was not sought to search Moussaoui's belongings (not just his computer), was that knowledge of the Phoenix EC did not circulate at FBI headquarters. When Moussaoui's belongings were searched after 9/11, evidence was found connecting him to two of the hijackers' associates: Ramzi Bin Al Shibh and Yazid Sufaat. It would have been a relatively simple matter to trace the hijackers in the US from Bin Al Shibh based on their phone calls, the fact that they lived with him for years and the surveillance of the Hamburg cell previously carried out by various agencies, including the CIA.

Basically, the reason a FISA warrant to search Moussaoui's belongings was not sought in the end is that it was thought he was not an agent of a foreign power – a requirement under the FISA Act for a warrant to be granted. Based on French information, he was known to be connected to the Chechen rebels, but the connection was a little tenuous (he had merely encouraged an acquaintance to fight for them) and there was some dispute over whether they were a proper foreign power; for example, one agent thought they weren't a foreign power for FISA purposes because they weren't hostile to the US. It was also claimed that they were not sufficiently close to Bin Laden to be considered part of his organisation (which was a foreign power for FISA purposes).

The warrant was being sought by the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, which dealt with Muslim extremists that were not Al Qaeda. The Phoenix Memo, which dealt with Al Qaeda and Al Muhjiroun operatives learning to fly in the US (primarily at Embry-Riddle University in Prescott, Arizona), was assigned to the RFU on 30 July, just over two weeks before Moussaoui was arrested. Following its assignment, it was accessed by intelligence operations specialist (IOS) Ellen, who discussed it with a colleague from the Usama Bin Laden Unit, who then discussed it with her boss. It was also accessed by IOS Robin on 22 August regarding the Moussaoui warrant (because the Phoenix Memo referenced the leader of the Chechen rebels). She printed it out and must have read it, but did not have a specific memory of reading it. “She said she did not know why she did not bring the EC to anyone's attention.” (p. 207/217)

Continued at link
http://www.911blogger.com/node/2972

There is a difference between the 9/11 Commission's account of awareness of United 175's hijacking and the version used in the recent CBC documentary the Secret History of 9/11.

The 9/11 Commission gives the following account of a conversion between New York ATC Centre and the FAA Command Centre in Herndon:
"NEW YORK COMMAND CENTRE: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us...
We're, we're involved with something else; we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here." (p. 22, 9/11 CR)

However, CBC lays it out a little differently:
"NEW YORK COMMAND CENTRE: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us."
"NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER: We're, we're involved with something else; we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here."
Link:
http://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/secrethist...

More at link:
http://www.911blogger.com/node/2806