Dedicated, fully-automatic, assault rifles may be difficult to acquire through traditional channels in most states, but weapons such as the AK-47 and SKS, even in stock semi-automatic form, can be made to fire just as fast as their fully automatic counterparts. One time when I went shooting, in California nonetheless with some of the country's tightest gun laws, I saw someone "bump fire" a simple .22 cal Ruger rifle and unload a 30 round banana clip in less than two seconds.

Now that's what I call "full-auto fun!"

Unfortunately, lax gun sales throughout the United States are responsible for a sizable amount of the global trade in small arms and light weapons; recent reports have stated that the Drug Cartels responsible for destabilizing Mexican border towns acquire as much as 95% of their assault rifles from the United States. This is achieved by ordinary citizens, without criminal records, buying weapons in bulk at gun shows and shops, and then either driving them across the border themselves, or giving them to someone to do this. While border controls between the United States and Mexico are poor, where interstate travel is concerned they are practically non-existent.

Despite staggering numbers of annual killings with assault rifles, it isn't until a more dramatic shooting occurs that people begin to question the flawed argument: "guns need to be available for 'good citizens,' so that they can protect themselves from the 'bad people' who would acquire the weapons illegally anyways." Almost to a bullet, the weapons in the possession of criminals in the United States were originally acquired by legal methods. Sadly, the power of lobbying organizations, such as the NRA, prevent attempts by politicians to place even the most rudimentary restrictions on gun ownership in the United States, and romantic notions of self-reliant frontiersmen, and fundamentalist interpretations of the 2nd Amendment unfairly color the debate.

Sen. McCain often cites his military and foreign relations credentials, while charging that Sen. Obama’s lack of these assets make him a dangerous liability in the Oval Office. On two points, however, it appears that Obama’s recent education in military thought helped him avoid major mistakes that McCain has made. These mistakes are: 1) the academic (read “military academic”) difference between tactics and strategy, and 2) the effectiveness of the “Surge” per se.

Of these mistakes, the difference between tactics and strategy is less important by far. In short, “tactics” refers to maneuvers on the battlefield, and “strategy” refers to events which happen beyond the horizon. Examples of tactics are a general’s decision to: use a one or two pronged attack, attempt to envelop the enemy, or perform a feint to shake an enemy force’s “balance”.

One elegant example of “strategy”, is Napoleon’s “manoeuvre sur les derrieres” -maneuvering to attack an enemy’s industry instead of seeking out frontal attacks between two armies. This forces the enemy to choose between seeing their supply lines cut, or rushing to meet Napoleon in a hastily prepared and disorganized fashion. Tommy Frank’s recent capture of Baghdad has often been considered a brilliant “strategic” move, when in fact, successful as it was; it was little more than a glorified “pincers” tactic. In Friday’s debate, Sen. Obama was correct in calling the “Surge” a tactic.

The perceived effectiveness of the “Surge”, however, is the far more grievous error. The widely read “Strategy”, by B.H. Liddell Hart, provides a list of “do’s” and “don’ts” in the formulation of proper strategy and tactics. Relevant lessons which can be applied to the surge are: “7. Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard”, and “8. Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form)”. These negative lessons are applicable to the “Surge”, because while there were some minor changes in tactics, i.e. “capture, clear, hold”, the main element of the “Surge” was the addition of approximately 20,000 combat troops. This is a very linear enhancement to a “force on force” strategy that should not have achieved the effect witnessed.

Instead of such a limited change to the counterinsurgency approach; which, in theory, should have heavily increased casualties for several years, the occupying forces should have sought a strategy which shook the balance of the insurgency. Liddell Hart illustrates this by describing two men fighting –they could just try to overwhelm each other with brute strength, which would just make both men collapse from exhaustion, or they could try to trip the other fighter like in a judo match. It is highly unlikely that a “Surge”-like change in tactics could reduce Iraqi violence to current levels, so more credence must be given to other factors at work in Iraq.

One element is probably the diplomatic successes between occupying forces, and Sunni leaders within Iraq. To say that the “Surge” was responsible for these successes would be a stretch to say the least. In past conflicts, such as the French occupation of Algiers, it is unthinkable that a “Surge” would have ended the daily bloodshed that was experienced for so many years. In fact, it is more likely that the “Sunni Awakening” was a coincidence, and to praise the “Surge” for reductions in violence is a chronological fallacy.

What this means for the situation in Iraq, is that the current levels of violence in the country could increase at any moment, despite the additional troops present in the country. Additionally, by precipitously crediting the “Surge” for progress in Iraq, is to ignore the political opportunities fortune has presented us. It is unlikely that Sunni leaders would like to see the U.S. occupation go on much longer, and with every Sunni leader that is killed by friendly U.S. fire, the country inches back towards civil war. To paraphrase Clausewitz, combat devoid of the political end is not war, but mindless violence -it would be wise for policymakers to remember this, and avoid declaring "Mission Accomplished" once again.